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11 Introduction
In this paper we examine the potential that national ﬁscal policy has to help stabilise in-
dividual economies within a monetary union. While the vulnerability of monetary unions
to asymmetric shocks are well known, there has been surprising little analysis of the
extent to which ﬁscal policy can overcome these problems within the framework of the
new international macroeconomics (see Lane (2001) for a survey). This is despite the
fact that policy makers in potential members of the European Monetary Union have ac-
tively discussed the possibility of using ﬁscal policy in this way (Treasury (2003), Swedish
Committee (2002)).
One advantage of using a model with clear microfoundations is that we can directly
compute welfare, using a measure explicitly derived from agents utility. In addition,
we can directly address the issue of solvency, and investigate the extent to which the
requirement that ﬁscal policy ensures debt stability may or may not conﬂict with using
ﬁscal policy for macroeconomic stabilisation. While our analysis does not deal directly
with some of the important political economy issues involved in using ﬁscal policy as a
countercyclical tool (see e.g. Calmfors (2003)), it should help inform that debate. In
particular, one of the issues we investigate is whether there is a signiﬁcant welfare cost to
restricting ﬁscal policy to respond to diﬀerences between national and union wide inﬂation
and output.
Our analytical framework is close to that in a recent paper by Beetsma and Jensen
(2004), whose model is in turn based on a model developed in Benigno and Benigno
(2000). They also look at the role of ﬁscal policy in a microfounded two country model
of monetary union. However our analysis is more general in three important respects.
First, while their representative consumers are identical across countries (and therefore
consume an identical basket), we allow for some home bias in consumption, along lines
that are familiar from Gali and Monacelli (2002), for example1. Second, while both
papers embody nominal inertia in the form of Calvo contracts, we also allow for some
additional inﬂation inertia, using a set up outlined in Steinsson (2003). This not only
makes our model more realistic 2, but it also gives policy a greater potential role in
inﬂuencing the dynamic response to shocks. Inﬂation inertia introduces a key potential
instability into the economies of the union, and so a stabilising ﬁscal policy may become
vital. Third, while consumers in Beetsma and Jensen (2004) are inﬁnitely lived and
Ricardian, we allow for non-Ricardian behaviour by adopting the constant probability of
death model due to Blanchard (1985). (Blanchard/Yaari consumers are also modelled in
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2001) who examine issues of stability and monetary/ﬁscal policy
interaction in a monetary union, and Smets and Wouters (2002)). Allowing non-Ricardian
behaviour is important when looking at the interrelationships between debt management
and macroeconomic stabilisation. 3
In the same manner as Beetsma and Jensen (2004), the monetary union is not open
to the rest of the world, and the two member countries are big with respect to each
1See also Duarte and Wolman (2002).
2See Mankiw (2001), Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2002) among many others.
3In some respects our set up is more restrictive than Beetsma and Jensen (2004): for example, we
assume our two economies are of equal size while they do not.
1other.With these assumptions, our approach is complementary to the one in Gali and
Monacelli (2004), who consider many small countries in a monetary union. In their
paper each country is small, and is subject to idiosyncratic shocks. We focus on big
countries, subject to asymmetric shocks. We assume that although ﬁscal decisions are
taken independently, each ﬁscal authority can react to events in the other country, as well
as to its own. We follow Beetsma and Jensen (2004), in that our monetary union is not
open to the rest of the world.
One of the diﬃculties of working with a richer model is that the benevolent policy
makers loss function can depart substantially from the objective function that monetary
policy makers are generally assumed to follow. In this paper, therefore, we consider
an alternative to our main case where the monetary authorities optimise a conventional
welfare function, which is a sum of squares of deviation of inﬂation and output from their
target values. However, as our analysis of ﬁscal policy is designed to be normative rather
than realistic, we always optimise ﬁscal rules with respect to the social loss derived from
individual agents utility. There is a standard problem about how to avoid linear terms
in such a measure of social loss. There are three common approaches to resolving this
problem. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) following Sims (2000), abandon the linear-
quadratic framework and instead work with second-order approximations to the model
equations. As an alternative, Benigno and Woodford (2003), Benigno and Woodford
(2004), and Sutherland (2002) assume speciﬁc policy rules, which of themselves remove
the linear terms4. However, for our purposes it is more convenient to take a third approach
(as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Benigno and Benigno (2000) for example),
where we assume the existence of an employment subsidy, ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation,
precisely of the kind necessary to remove linear terms in the measure of social loss.
2 The Model
2.1 The Setup
Our monetary union consists of two economies, labelled a and b. Each of these is inhabited
by a large number of individuals and ﬁrms. Each representative individual specialises in
the production of one diﬀerentiated good, denoted by z,a n ds p e n d sh(z) of eﬀort on its
production. He consumes a consumption basket C, and also derives utility from per capita
government consumption G. Private and public consumption are not perfect substitutes.
In each of the two economies the consumption basket consists of two composite goods,
the domestic composite good (produced in the home country, subscripts Ha,Hb), the
foreign composite good from the other open economy (produced in the foreign country,
subscripts Hb,Ha). Each composite good consists of a continuum of produced goods
z ∈ [0,1]. We also assume that countries a and b are identical in all their parameters.
In order not to repeat symmetric equations, we will use the index k for a single country
in the union, k ∈ {a,b}, and use index ¯ k to denote the other country, i.e. if k = a then
¯ k = b,i fk = b then ¯ k = a.
4Sutherland (2002) imposes a form of policy which is too speciﬁc for our purposes, while Benigno and
Woodford (2003), Benigno and Woodford (2004) impose a ‘timeless perspective’ on policy.











[u(Cs,ξs)+f(Gs,ξs) − v(hs(z),ξs)] (1)
where we allow for taste/technology shocks ξ. Domestically produced goods may be con-




where the superscript denotes the ﬁnal destination of consumption goods, whose price is
denominated in a diﬀerent currency than that of country k. gk(z) is government consump-
tion. Superscripts denote currency denomination, where necessary. We assume that the
government in each country consumes the domestically produced good only, so gHk = gk.
All goods are aggregated into a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) consumption index with the
elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods given by  t > 1 (which is a stochastic











Every household consumes both domestic and foreign goods with the elasticity of


















where the index t is suppressed for notational convenience, αd is the share of consumption
of domestic goods, αn is the share of consumption of goods imported from the neighbour
country (the other open economy), k ∈ {a,b}.
2.2 Demand: Optimal Consumption Decisions
An individual chooses optimal consumption and work eﬀort to maximise the criterion (1)
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint:
∞ X
s=t










(1+ik)(1+p),i t is short-
term interest rate and Bkt are nominal bond holdings, k ∈ {a,b}.H e r ew i st h ew a g er a t e ,
and τ a constant tax rate on labour income. In equilibrium we assume π =0 .
5We make this parameter stochastic to allow us to generate shocks to the mark-up of ﬁrms.
3The household optimisation problem is standard (see Appendix and Smets and Wouters





















where 1/Φkt is average propensity to consume out of total resources (nominal ﬁnancial
wealth and human wealth, see Appendix X), 1+rt =( 1+it)/(1 + πt+1) is real interest
rate, parameter σ is deﬁned as: σ = −uC(C,1)/uCC(C,1)C.
As aggregate assets accumulate as:
Aat+1 =( 1+it)(Aat +( 1− τ)PHatYat − PatCat) (7)
We denote At = At/Pt−1, and linearise equations (5), (6) and (7) around the steady
state (for each variable Xt with steady state value X,w eu s et h en o t a t i o n ˆ Xt =l n ( Xt/X)).
Equation (5), leads to the following Euler equation (intertemporal IS curve):




( ˆ Akt+1−ˆ πkt+1− ˆ Φkt+1))−σ(ˆ ıt−ˆ πkt+1)+ˆ ξkt−ˆ ξkt+1 (8)
where the average propensity to consume evolves as:
(1 + p)(1 + i)
β
σ(1 + i)σ
ˆ Φat = ˆ Φat+1 − (1 − σ)(ˆ ıt − ˆ πat+1) − ˆ ξat + ˆ ξat+1 (9)
here θ = C/Y is a steady state share of private consumption in Y and A is the steady
state level of real assets as a share of Y .
The assets equation can be linearsied as







ˆ Ckt + αn ˆ Sk¯ kt
´
) (10)






































We deﬁne the terms of trade Sab, the nominal exchange rate Eab, and the real exchange













2.3 Supply: Pricing Decisions by Firms
In order to describe price setting decisions we split ﬁrms into two groups according to
their pricing behaviour, following Steinsson (2003). In each period, each ﬁrm is able to
reset its price with probability 1−γ, and otherwise, with probability γ, its price will rise
at the steady state rate of domestic inﬂation. Among those ﬁr m ,w h i c ha r ea b l et or e s e t
their price, a proportion of 1 − ω are forward-looking and set prices optimally, while a
fraction ω are backward-looking and set their prices according to a rule of thumb.
Forward-looking ﬁrms are proﬁt-maximising, they reset prices optimally, given Calvo-
type constraints on price setting, that results in the following formula for PF
Hk,t,w h i c h




Hk,t = γβ ˆ P
F
Hk,t+1 + γβπHk,t+1 (16)
+
(1 − γβ)ψ
ψ +  
µ












)ˆ ξkt +ˆ ηkt
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where πHk,t is resulting domestic inﬂation in country k.













Hk,t−1 is the average domestic price in the previous period, ΠHk,t = PHk,t/PHk,t−1
is past period growth rate of prices and Ykt/Y n
kt is output relative to the ﬂexible-price
equilibrium. For the economy as a whole, the price equation can be written as:
Pt =[ γ(ΠPt−1)
1− t +( 1− γ)(1 − ω)(P
F
t )






Following Steinsson (2003) and allowing for government consumption terms in the
utility function, we can derive the following Phillips curve for our economy, written in
terms of log-deviations from the steady state6:
ˆ πHkt = χβˆ πHkt+1 +( 1− χ)ˆ πHkt−1 + κc ˆ Ckt + κs ˆ Sabt (19)






)ˆ ξkt +ˆ ηkt
6The derivation is identical to the one in Steinsson (2003), amended by the introduction of mark-up
shocks as in Beetsma and Jensen (2003). A detailed derivation is given in Appendix A.2.
5Coeﬃcients χ and κs are given in Appendix A.2 as functions of γ and ω and other struc-
tural parameters. Although the constant wage income tax τ has no eﬀect on the dynamic
equations for log-deviations from the ﬂexible price equilibrium, it alters the equilibrium
choice between consumption and leisure for the consumer. The Phillips curve (19) has a
familiar structure where both current and past output have an eﬀect on inﬂation. Its spec-
iﬁcation is derived in Steinsson (2003) and we brieﬂy repeat this derivation in Appendix
A.2, where we explain our open-economy extension. In the case when all consumers are
forward-looking, i.e. ω =0 , this Phillips curve collapses to the standard forward-looking
Phillips curve (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)). If all consumers use the rule of
thumb in price-setting decisions, i.e. if ω =1 , this Phillips curve can be brought into
the form of an ‘accelerationist’ Phillips curve. The presence of the term of trade in the
Phillips curve is due to the fact that people consume a basket of goods but, of course,
produce only domestic goods.
2.4 The Economy as a Whole
2.4.1 Aggregate Demand
Aggregate demand for country k ∈ {a,b}, is given by a linearised GDP identity:
ˆ Ykt = θαd ˆ Ckt + θαn ˆ C
¯ k
¯ kt +( 1− θ) ˆ Gkt +2 θηαdαn ˆ Sk¯ kt (20)
The derivation of this formula is sketched in Appendix A.4. The parameter θ denotes the
share of private consumption in output, so 1 − θ is the share of the government sector in
the economy.
2.4.2 Aggregate Supply
The Phillips curve equation (19) contains terms in the preference shock ξ. These can be
replaced by consumption, output and the terms of trade at their ‘natural’ level (superscript
n), which is the level of these variables that would occur in an economy with ﬂexible prices
and no mark-up shocks. Under ﬂexible prices the real wage is always equal to the inverse
of this mark-up, see Appendix A.2. Optimisation by consumers then implies (we assume














where µt = −(1 −  t)/ t is a monopolistic mark-up and µw is employment subsidy for



















)ˆ ξk =0 (22)
2.4.3 Fiscal Constraint
We assume that the government buys goods (G), taxes income (with tax rate τ), and
issues nominal debt B. The evolution of the nominal debt stock can be written as:
Bkt+1 =( 1+it)(Bkt + GktPHkt − τYktPHkt) (23)
6This equation can be linearised as (assuming Bt = Bt/Pt−1):







where B is the steady state level of real bonds as a share of Y .
There is no capital in this model, so the amount of bonds issued is equal to the amount
of bonds held:
Aat + Abt = Bat + Bbt
2.4.4 Financial Markets
We assume complete capital markets with perfect capital mobility and thus a common
interest rate.
2.5 Putting things together
We now write down the ﬁnal system of equations for the ‘law of motion’ of the out-of-
equilibrium economy. We simplify notation by denoting gap variables with lower case
letters: for any variable xt = ˆ Xt − ˆ Xn
t . We can use relationship (22) to substitute out
ξ—shock terms in the Phillips curve and the Euler equation, and rewrite the dynamic
system in ‘gap’ form. (We also substitute out for consumer price inﬂa t i o ni nt e r m so f
domestic inﬂation and exchange rates and denote ν = Bp/Φθ, µ =[ β(1 + i)]
−σ.)
cat = µcat+1 + µν(aat+1 − φat+1) − σit +( σ − µν)(αdπHat+1 + αnπHbt+1) (25)
cbt = µcbt+1 + µν(abt+1 − φbt+1) − σit +( σ − µν)(αdπHbt+1 + αnπHat+1) (26)
(1 + p)(1 + i)µφat = φat+1 − (1 − σ)(it − αdπHat+1 − αnπHbt+1)
(1 + p)(1 + i)µφbt = φbt+1 − (1 − σ)(it − αdπHbt+1 − αnπHat+1)
7πHa,t = χβπHa,t+1 +( 1− χ)πHa,t−1 + κccat + κy0yat + κy1yat−1 + κDst +ˆ ηat (27)
πHb,t = χβπHb,t+1 +( 1− χ)πHb,t−1 + κccbt + κy0ybt + κy1ybt−1 − κDst +ˆ ηbt (28)



























yat)+i(1 − αD)st (32)






ybt) − i(1 − αD)st (33)
aat+1 = it +( 1+i)(aat − αdπHat − αnπHbt +
(1 − τ)
B





abt = bat + bbt − aat (35)
Equations (25) - (26) are consumption equations for each country from (8), written
in terms of domestic inﬂation. Equations (29) and (30) are aggregate demand equations
from (20). Equation (31) follows from the requirement of the ﬁxed nominal exchange
rate between countries a and b. From the system it is clear that cost-push shocks ˆ η are
distortionary. The absence of terms in taste shocks shows that taste shocks alone have no
impact on gap variables. However, as we show below, taste shocks do inﬂuence natural
levels and therefore the size of the impact of cost-push shocks on welfare.
2.6 Policy Framework
In this paper, we study simple and potentially implementable ﬁscal rules. We postulate
that ﬁscal authorities operate with rules in a form
gkt = θπkπkt−1 + θπ¯ kπ¯ kt−1 + θykykt−1 + θy¯ ky¯ kt−1 + θssk¯ kt−1 + θkbkt−1
Excluding contemporary shocks or the current value of variables from the reaction function
capturures to some extent lags in the operation of ﬁscal policy. Monetary policy, in
contrast, is considered to be optimal and not subject to implementation lags, and will
take into account all available information. We assume monetary policy is formulated
under commitment (i.e. it is time inconsistent), but results are very similar if we assume
a discretionary (time consistent) policy.
If the ﬁscal authorities are given such rules, and monetary authorities use some op-
timising policy, this leads to a stochastic equilibria that should be compared across a
suitable metric. The coeﬃcients θ are then chosen such that it would optimise the chosen
welfare criterion. Clearly setting some θ to zero reduces the information set that the ﬁscal
authorities can respond to, so worse outcomes will be achieved. In this paper we examine
the magnitude of the cost of these restrictions.
Optimal simple rules are time inconsistent. A social planner, which designs such a rule
for the ﬁscal authorities, assumes given optimal reactions of both monetary authorities
8and the private sector (see Currie and Levine (1985) for discussion). Thus the ﬁscal
authorities precommit themselves to a rule. In addition, we no longer have certainty
equivalence, and so optimal θ will be dependent on the assumed distribution of shocks.
We examine the robustness of this choice below.










where intra-period loss Ws takes the form (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Beetsma
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+ µy∆π (yas−1∆πHas + ybs−1∆πHbs)+tip(3)
There are two unconventional features of this loss function. First, terms with µ−coeﬃcients
are present only because of rule of thumb price setters. The presence of these terms implies
that inﬂation and output will be brought back to the equilibrium smoothly. Steinsson
(2003) has shown that when the private sector is predominantly backward-looking, terms
with weights denoted by µ dominate the loss function, and that conversely, when the
private sector is forward-looking these µ−terms essentially disappear. Second, the terms
with weights denoted by ν arise; as Kirsanova, Leith, and Wren-Lewis (2004) discuss in
detail, in an open economy with taste/technology shocks it is in general no longer optimal
to exactly reproduce the ﬂexible price equilibrium, because changes in the terms of trade
alter the impact of the monopoly distortion, and this introduces ‘linear in policy’ terms
with a ν coeﬃcient.
As a benchmark case we assume that the monetary authorities use union-wide social
welfare function. However, as monetary policy cannot react to diﬀerences between the
two economies (where there is no change in aggregate union wide variables), then this










































9This eliminates cross terms from (36). Alternatively, and equivalently, it is the closed
economy version of (36).
To interpret the resulting values of the social loss, we can express them in terms of
compensating consumption — the permanent fall in the steady state consumption level that
would balance the welfare gain from eliminating the volatility of consumption, government
spending and leisure (Lucas (1987)). As explained in Appendix C, the percentage change
in consumption level, Ω, that is needed to compensate diﬀerences in welfare of two regimes











s−t (U2s − U1s)

 (38)
As we note above, some aspects of this social loss function are diﬀerent from the, more
adhoc, loss functions traditionally assumed to drive monetary policy. We therefore also
examine an alternative case where the monetary authority seek to minimise the following












2 +0 .5(xas + xbs)
2¤
. (39)
In other words, the central bank targets union-wide consumer price inﬂation and output7.
We take the value of 0.5 for the weight on output variability as a conventional value in
the literature.
3C a l i b r a t i o n
Because of the microfounded nature of the model, there are relatively few parameters to
calibrate, given in Table 1. One period is taken as equal to one quarter of a year. We set
the discount factor of the private sector (and policy makers) to β =0 .99.
Our knowledge regarding inﬂation persistence is very insecure. All empirical studies
are unanimous in concluding that an empirical Phillips curve has a signiﬁcant backward-
looking component. The estimates of the exact weight χ, however, diﬀer widely. Gali and
Gertler (1999), Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2002) ﬁnd a predominantly forward-looking
speciﬁcation of the Phillips curve, while Mehra (2004) ﬁnds an extremely backward-
looking speciﬁcation. Mankiw (2001) argues that stylised empirical facts are inconsis-
tent with predominantly forward-looking Phillips Curve. Therefore, we calibrate ω =0 .5
f o rt h eb a s e - l i n ec a s es p e c i ﬁcation, which corresponds to a forward-looking coeﬃcient of
χ =0 .3 in the Phillips curve (27)-(28), but we also look at robustness to alternative
values extensively below. To calibrate parameter δ we follow Stensson’s procedure, which
is as follows. The possible range of values for ω in the Phillips curve is 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1. As
noted above, when ω → 0 it collapses to the familiar purely forward-looking speciﬁcation
of Woodford (2003) πt = βπt+1 + κcct + κy0yt + κsst, whilst when ω → 1, it collapses
to πt = πt−1 +( 1− γ)δxt−1, which is the accelerationist Phillips curve. The Stensson’s
7Using consumer price inﬂation reﬂects current practice among central banks.
10procedure for calibrating δ assumes that demand pressure in both these extreme cases
is equal, i.e. it assumes that κc + κy0 =( 1− γ)δ. T h i se q u a t i o nc a nt h e nb es o l v e dt o
p r o v i d eav a l u ef o rδ. With this choice of δ total demand pressure in our general speci-
ﬁcation is independent of the number of rule-of-thumb price setters, ω, and is equal to:
κ = κc + κy0 + κy1 =( 1− γ)(1 − γβ)/σγ.
We follow the literature in calibrating γ =0 .75, which implies that, on average,
prices (and wages) last for one year. We assume that each economy consumes 30% of
imported goods. For the parameters related to ﬁscal policy, we calibrate the ratio of
private consumption to output as 75 percent; and we assume that the equilibrium ratio
of domestic debt to output is 60 percent. Then the debt accumulation equation gives us
the equilibrium level of the primary surplus and the tax rate.
This calibration completely deﬁnes the coeﬃcients of the welfare function, which are
given in Table 1. It is apparent that the resulting coeﬃcient on output stabilisation in
social welfare, λ, is very small (at around 0.01) compared to the weight traditionally
adopted in the monetary policy literature of around8 0.5. In order to compute the social
loss, we calibrate the standard deviations of shocks hitting the economies as follows. We
assume that the standard deviations of cost-push and taste/technology shocks are equal
(in the literature a consensus number is 0.5%, see, e.g. Jensen and McCallum (2002),
Bean, Nikolov, and Larsen (2002)), and all shocks are independent.
4R e s u l t s
Table 2 presents some key results for the model with Blanchard-Yaari consumers. The
columns of the Table represent diﬀerent forms of ﬁscal policy rule, where in each case
the optimal parameter values are computed in the face of cost-push and taste/technology
shocks. We also show the feedback parameters for optimal monetary policy in each case:
however, these parameters should be interpreted with caution, because they are part of an
optimal rule under commitment which also involves additional Lagrange multipliers. The
ﬁrst column of numbers represents the case where there is no ﬁscal stabilisation, although
there is feedback on debt (see below). The social loss under each policy, measured in
absolute loss units, is shown in the ﬁrst row, while the second row computes the gain in
consumption units relative to the no ﬁscal stabilisation column.
One important restriction placed on ﬁscal policy in all the cases presented in this
Table, is that there needs to be some minimum feedback on own public debt to ensure
solvency when monetary policy is active. Numerical simulations show that with our choice
of parameters, a minimal ﬁscal rule of a form gt = −µbt will ensure saddle path stability of
the system if µ & 0.027. Obviously, if ﬁscal policy feeds back on other variables, then this
threshold will change, but it appears to change only slightly. However in all cases we ﬁnd
the optimal (given the social welfare function) value of this coeﬃcient, but as the Table
shows, it is only marginally greater than this minimum value. (For further discussion of
this critical feedback value, see Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2004), Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2001), Kirsanova, Vines, and Wren-Lewis (2004)).
8This larger conventional value may result from the demand-driven unemployment. This phenomenon
is not addressed in our model.
11Key Parameters Mnemonics Value
Discount factor β 0.99
Share of rule-of-thumb price-setters ω 0.5
Proportion of agents who able to reset their price within
ap e r i o d
1 − γ 0.25
Weight on demand pressure in the Phillips curve κ 0.3
Share of the government sector in the economy 1 − θ 0.65
Steady state ratio of domestic debt to output B/Y 0.6
Intertemporal substitution rate σ 0.5
Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods
η 0.3
Elasticity of substitution between two domestic goods   5.0
Production risk aversion 1/ψ 0.5
Share of domestic goods in consumption basket αd 0.7
Openness with respect to the other small open economy αn 0.2
Implied Parameters in system (25)-(31) Mnemonics Value
Tax Rate τ 0.256
Steady state ratio of primary real surplus to output δd 0.006
Weight on forward inﬂation in PC χ 0.3
Weight on the country’s term of trade vs. the rest of the
world in AD
2θηαdαn 0.09
Table 1: Parameter values
12T h ec o l u m n( 2 w )p r e s e n t sw h a tc o u l db er e g a r d e da st h eo t h e re x t r e m eb e n c h m a r k
case, where we allow ﬁscal policy to feedback on a wide range of variables: own country in-
ﬂation, output and debt, the foreign country’s inﬂation and output, and the real exchange
rate. We can note that welfare is substantially improved by allowing comprehensive ﬁscal
stabilisation (Hughes Hallett and Vines (1991), Driver and Wren-Lewis (1999) for similar
results on less microfounded models). Column (2h) restricts ﬁscal policy to react to own
country variables alone (and the terms of trade). There is no welfare cost in making this
restriction.
The remaining columns look at cases where we restrict ﬁscal policy to react to country
diﬀerentials in inﬂation and output. (Thus, government spending in country A reactions
to the diﬀerence between output or inﬂation in A compared to B. They continue to react
to their own debts levels.) A key result is that, as long as the reaction function contains
lagged inﬂation, the loss involved in restricting ﬁscal policy to react to diﬀerences is
minimal.
A comparison of the ﬁnal columns of the Table show that the presence of output or
t h et e r m so ft r a d ec o n t r i b u t ea l m o s tn o t h i n gt ot h ew e l f a r eb e n e ﬁts of ﬁscal stabilisation.
We need to remember, however, that our microfounded welfare function has a very low
weight on output, and so this result may not be surprising..The sign of the terms of
trade feedback implies that government spending is reduced if the price of domestic goods
exported overseas falls (so sab rises). Note also the optimal response to debt remains small
in all cases.
These results suggest substantial welfare gains from an active ﬁscal policy that reacts
to inﬂation diﬀerentials. To understand why, we need to recall that an introduction of
inﬂation inertia brings an important source of instability in an individual economy in
a monetary union. Suppose for some reason output in one country rises and output in
the other country falls, with no impact on union output. Inﬂa t i o ni nt h ec o u n t r yw i t h
higher output will gradually rise because of inﬂation inertia. Real interest rates in that
country will therefore fall, as nominal interest rates are ﬁxed at the union level and there
is no reason for monetary policy to change. (In contrast, if inﬂation was entirely forward-
looking, it would jump up and then gradually fall, so the expected real interest rate would
always be higher.) Lower real interest rates put further upward pressure on output and
inﬂation. Even if instability is avoided, the adjustment mechanism is slow and cyclical.
This is because the price level tends to overshoot: if prices are high this causes low
demand and disinﬂation; when the price level, and demand, have returned to zero prices
are still falling. This will lead to high demand in the future, which will cause a return
of inﬂation and higher prices and so on9. This is illustrated by the impulse responses in
F i g u r e1 .T op r e v e n tt h i sc y c l i c a l i t yr e q u i r e ss o m ef o r mo fi n ﬂation control by the ﬁscal
authorities, which is in our framework is manifested through a substantial coeﬃcient on
the inﬂation diﬀerential for a ﬁscal feedback rule. This is an important result in the light
of some proposals (Treasury (2003)) which have suggested that national ﬁscal policy focus
exclusively on output gaps, and not inﬂation. Our results suggest this would be severely
suboptimal.
Similar factors account for why the optimal feedback on debt is small. Following a
9For detailed dynamic analysis of instability mechanisms in a monetary union when inﬂation is per-
sistent, see Kirsanova, Vines, and Wren-Lewis (2004).
13positive inﬂation shock, lower real interest rates would reduce the debt stock. If ﬁscal
feedback on debt was large, this would add to government spending and further boost
demand. Only a small feedback on debt is required to ensure solvency (see above), but
larger feedback would aggrevate the cyclical behaviour of the economy under inﬂation
inertia following asymmetric shocks, and this reduces welfare.
T h es i g no nt h et e r mo ft r a d ei nt h eo p t i m a lﬁscal reaction function comes from another
dynamic mechanism. The negative sign on the term of trade implies that ﬁscal policy is
counteracting the eﬀect of competitiveness on domestic demand. We might have viewed
this competitiveness eﬀect as inherently stabilising (a fall in the domestic price level raises
the demand for domestic goods, thereby raising inﬂation). However this feedback process
is also cyclical (Kirsanova, Vines, and Wren-Lewis (2004)). Stabilisation can be achieved
more eﬀectively be direct feedback on inﬂation and output, so the optimal ﬁscal rule tries
to neutralise this competitiveness eﬀect. As a check on this intuition, we increased the
size of the demand elasticity, and we found that the optimal feedback on the terms of
trade increased proportionately.
To see how robust these results are, we conducted a number of additional experiments.
In Table 2, optimal policies are computed for a given distribution of shocks. Thus all the
coeﬃcients, and the welfare-consumption ﬁgures in the two top rows, correspond to the
base line case with uncorrelated cost-push and preference shocks with identical standard
deviations. Having obtained these optimal policy rules, we hit the economy with shocks
drawn from diﬀerent distributions. We have found that the maximum loss relative to the
base line case is achieved when the economy is hit by asymmetric shocks. The second row
with consumption percentage in Table 2 contains diﬀerence in consumption between the
case of no ﬁscal stabilisation under uncorrelated shocks (our base case, against these shocks
t h eo p t i m a lr u l ei sd e s i g n e d )a n dt h ec a s ew h e ne c o n o m yi sh i tb ya s y m m e t r i cs h o c k so f
similar amplitude. The uncorrelated shocks in the base case can be decomposed into a
sum of symmetric and asymmetric shocks, and in this case we have only the asymmetric
component. These shocks only partly removed by ﬁscal policy and consumption gain from
this operation constitutes, for example, 1.62% for the case (2w). If we hit the economy
with two sets of symmetric shocks but control it with the same rules designed to deal with
uncorrelated shocks, we get 3.33% gain in consumption: monetary policy removes them
successfully.
Our results are also robust to replacing Blanchard-Yaari consumers with inﬁnitely
lived consumers (the setup similar to Beetsma and Jensen (2004) paper, and those papers
which ignore solvency constraint). The results are very similar and therefore are not
shown here. Clearly this similarity reﬂects the small size of the optimal feedback on debt
discussed above.
Finally we present in Table 3 results where monetary policy maximises the more
traditional welfare function discussed in Section 2.6. The qualitative results are very
similar to the main case where monetary policy maximises social welfare. The only
noticable diﬀerence is in comparing ﬁscal feedback on all variables with feedback on own
country variables alone. Whereas there was no welfare cost in making this restriction in
the main case, now there is some, although its size is not large. In addition, the behaviour
of the monetary authorities is diﬀerent in the cases where ﬁscal policy is not restricted
to responding to diﬀerences. In the main case, the parameters on the reaction function
14were all intuitive: interest rates rise in response to a positive cost push shock, and to
increases in lagged output and inﬂation. However, in this case the response to lagged
output and inﬂation has the opposite sign. We need to be cautious in interpreting these
parmeters, which are from a reaction function that also includes Lagrange multipliers that
are derived from full optimisation under commitment, and is therefore quite diﬀerent from
a simple policy rule. However one interpretation of this case is that the primary role of
macroeconomic stabilisation is being fulﬁlled by ﬁscal policy (government spending falls
if lagged inﬂation or output is high). Fiscal policy is more eﬀective in this case because
monetary policy is targetting the ’wrong’ objective i.e. traditional rather than social
welfare. Figure 2 illustrates the movements of both instruments following a symmetric
cost-push shock. It is also interesting to note that the coeﬃcients of the monetary policy
reaction function are more conventional when ﬁscal policy is restricted to reacting to
diﬀerences, as it can no longer respond to symmetric shocks, leaving monetary policy to
take the full burden of aggregate stabilisation in this case.
5C o n c l u s i o n
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v ee x a m i n e dt h ep o t e n t i a lr o l ef o rﬁscal policy to help stabilise indi-
vidual economies within a monetary union. While the vulnerability of monetary unions
to asymmetric shocks are well known, there has been surprising little analysis of the ex-
tent to which ﬁscal policy can overcome these problems within the framework of the new
international macroeconomics. This is despite the fact that policy makers in potential
members of the European Monetary Union have actively discussed the possibility of using
ﬁs c a lp o l i c yi nt h i sw a y( T r e a s u r y( 2 0 03), Swedish Committee (2002)).
Our analysis looks at the potential welfare gains from national governments operating
diﬀerent forms of simple rules for ﬁscal policy. We ﬁnd substantial welfare gains from gov-
ernment expenditure responding to national inﬂation. However there is very little welfare
beneﬁt from governments responding to other variables, including overseas variables or
the terms of trade. We also ﬁnd that the optimal feedback from government debt is only
slightly above the minimum level required to ensure solvency. These results appear robust
to the speciﬁcation of consumption, the distribution of shocks, and the goals of optimal
monetary policy.
These results have three important implications for the policy debate on ﬁscal policy
in a monetary union. First, we ﬁnd that the potential gains from ﬁscal stabilisation are
large, and that these do not conﬂict with the requirements for debt sustainability. Second,
these gains are largest when ﬁscal policy responds to inﬂation: responding to output alone
(as suggested in Treasury (2003), and analysed in Dixit and Lambertini (2003)) appears
severely suboptimal. Third, very little is lost if ﬁs c a lp o l i c yo n l yr e s p o n d st od i ﬀerences in
inﬂation and output, along with the level of national debt. This last result is important,







(1) (2w) (2h) (2d) (3d) (4d) (5d)
Blanchard-Yaari consumers and government solvency constraint
Absolute Units of Loss 7.66 4.37 4.40 4.37 4.39 4.39 7.56
Consumption gain, %
uncorrelated shocks
  0 1.62 1.60 1.62 1.61 1.61 0.05
asymmetric shocks† 0 3.33 3.32 3.33 3.31 3.32 0.11
symmetric shocks‡ 0 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Optimal Coeﬃcients for Fiscal Policy in country a
Inﬂation πa 0 -6.37 -12.81 -6.10 -6.47 -5.18 0
Output xa 0- 0 . 4 6 - 1 . 5 5 -0.43 -0.66 0 0
Debt ba -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Inﬂation πb 05 . 8 2 0 6.10 6.47 5.18 0
Output xb 00 . 4 0 0 0.43 0.66 0 0
Term of Trade sab 0 -0.44 0.26 -0.44 0 -0.64 -0.39
Optimal Commitment Solution for Monetary Policy (feedback on state variables only)
Cost-push shock
ηa+ηb
2 10.08 10.16 12.16 10.08 10.08 10.08 10.08
Inﬂation
πa+πb
2 3.46 3.39 1.04 3.46 3.46 3.46 3.46
Output
xa+xb
2 0.65 0.63 -0.01 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
Debt ba,b b 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Assets aa,a b 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
AS — automatic stabilisers (feedback on debt only);
  — expected shocks are uncorrelated, actual shocks are the same;
† — expected shocks are uncorrelated, actual supply shocks are perfectly positively corre-
lated;
‡ — expected shocks are uncorrelated, actual supply shocks are perfectly negatively corre-
lated







(1) (2w) (2h) (2d) (3d) (4d) (5d)
Blanchard-Yaari consumers and government solvency constraint
Absolute Units of Loss 8.65 4.55 5.30 5.36 5.38 5.38 8.55
Consumption gain, %
uncorrelated shocks
  0 2.01 1.65 1.62 1.61 1.61 0.05
asymmetric shocks† 0 3.30 3.18 3.30 1.28 1.28 0.11
symmetric shocks‡ 0 0.78 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Optimal Coeﬃcients for Fiscal Policy in country a
Inﬂation πa 0 -13.76 -12.95 -6.10 -6.47 -5.17 0
Output xa 0- 4 . 4 3 - 2 . 7 7 -0.43 -0.67 0 0
Debt ba -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Inﬂation πb 01 . 4 7 0 6.10 6.47 5.17 0
Output xb 0- 2 . 8 5 0 0.43 0.67 0 0
Term of Trade sab 0 -0.31 0.09 -0.44 0 -0.64 -0.39
Optimal Commitment Solution for Monetary Policy (feedback on state variables only)
Cost-push shock
ηa+ηb
2 0.79 1.88 7.76 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79
Inﬂation
πa+πb
2 0.54 -7.06 -2.92 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54
Output
xa+xb
2 0.03 -4.88 -1.44 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Debt ba,b b 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Assets aa,a b 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
AS — automatic stabilisers (feedback on debt only);
  — expected shocks are uncorrelated, actual shocks are the same;
† — expected shocks are uncorrelated, actual supply shocks are perfectly positively corre-
lated;
‡ — expected shocks are uncorrelated, actual supply shocks are perfectly negatively corre-
lated
Table 3: Optimal coeﬃcients for Monetary and Fiscal Policy. Monetary Policy uses
Traditional Welfare.















































































Figure 1: Monetary authorities use social welfare. Solid line denotes automatic stabilisers,
dashed line denotes the case where ﬁscal authorities feed back on all variables (2w).



















Figure 2: Movements of ﬁscal and monetary instruments to stabilise symmetric cost-push
shock. Monetary authorities use traditional objectives. Solid line denotes the case where
ﬁscal authorities do not attempt to stabilise symmetric shocks, dashed line denotes the
case where ﬁscal authorities feed back on all variables (case (2w)) and dotted line denotes
the case there the ﬁscal authorities are restricted to feed back on home country variables
only (case (2h)).
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22AD y n a m i c S y s t e m
A.1 Derivation of Consumption Equation
A.1.1 Individual Relationships
To derive the ﬁrst order conditions for household optimisation problem we write La-






















































































where we deﬁned real interest rate as: 1+rv := (1 + iv)/(1 + πkv+1).



















































































































































































































































































































































































































Pricing behaviour is taken as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Steinsson (2003).
Households are able to reset their price in each period with probability 1 − γ in which
case they re-contract a new price PF
H. For the rest of the household sector the price will
rise at the steady state rate of domestic inﬂation ΠH with probability γ:
PHkt = ΠHkPHkt−1
Those who recontract a new price (with probability 1 − γ), are split into backward-
looking individuals and forward-looking individuals, in proportion ω, such that the ag-


























kt is the eﬃcient level of output.






























Production possibilities are speciﬁed as follows:
ykt(z)=hkt(z)
The cost of supplying a good is given as Cost(z)= 1
µwwks(z)hks(z)= 1
µwwks(z)yks(z).
Where we assume some labour subsidy µw. We do not assume any other taxes and the
labour cost is the only cost.
Each producer understands that sales depend on demand, which is a function of price,




















































where µt = −  t
1− t, Mkt(z) is marginal cost and Rt,s is discount factor. This condition
holds for both ﬂexible and ﬁxed price equilibria. However, for the ﬁxed price equilibrium
the nominal marginal cost is a function of price, set at the period t. Substituting for the
































where τ is constant wage income tax. The linearisation of the equation (??)c a nb ef o u n d
in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) for the closed economy case. We brieﬂy repeat it here
for the open economy.
First of all, each term in the price-setting ﬁrst order conditions (??) is the product of
two terms, the term in curly brackets and the term in square brackets. The term in the
square brackets vanishes in the equilibrium so its deviations from the equilibrium are of
ﬁrst order. Therefore, all products of it with the ﬁr s tt e r mw i l lb eh i g h e rt h a no fﬁrst
order, unless the ﬁrst term is taken at its equilibrium level, which is (γβ)s−t, up to some
constant multiplier.


















































)ˆ ξks +ˆ ηks]
where ˆ Sk¯ k =
PH¯ k










































)ˆ ξks +ˆ ηks]
27Here we also used the fact that the linearisation of the similar equation for the ﬂexible
price equilibrium helps to get rid of shocks and write down the optimisation equation
in terms of gaps with natural levels for output and consumption. Here αn ˆ Sk¯ k comes in
as the result of the wedge between consumption of the CPI basket and the production
of domestic goods and diﬀerent prices set on them. The constant tax rate, τ, does not
enter the ﬁnal formula when written in log-deviations from equilibrium (see Benigno and
Benigno (2000) for similar derivation).
This can be rewritten in a quasi-diﬀerenced form as:
ˆ p
f
Hkt = γβˆ p
f




















)ˆ ξkt +ˆ ηkt
¶
A.2.2 Rule of thumb price-setters and Phillips curve
The rule of thumb price-setters use formula (48) to set the new price. The linearisation
of this equation (using (47)) straightforwardly yields:
ˆ P
b














so we have the following equations
ˆ P
b
Hkt =( 1− ω) ˆ P
f
Hkt−1 + ω ˆ P
b




((1 − ω) ˆ P
f





Hkt = γβˆ p
f

















)ˆ ξkt +ˆ ηkt]
Doing manipulations similar to Steinsson (2003) (A.1)-(A.6) we eliminate ˆ Pb
Hkt and ˆ p
f
Hkt
and obtain the following speciﬁcation of the Phillips curve
πHkt =
γ
γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ)
βπHkt+1 +
ω




γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ)
δˆ Ykt−1 −
(1 − γ)γβω
γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ)
δˆ Ykt
+
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)(1 − ω)ψ
(γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ))(ψ +  )













)ˆ ξkt +ˆ ηkt]
28Substituting taste/technology shock from (22) we come to the form written in gaps:
πHkt =
γ
γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ)
βπHkt+1 +
ω




γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ)
δykt−1 −
(1 − γ)γβω
γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ)
δykt
+
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)(1 − ω)ψ








Note that when ω =0then the Phillips curve collapses to the standard forward-looking
speciﬁcation:
πHkt = βπHkt+1 +
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)ψ




















(γβδykt − δykt−1). (55)
This equation was obtained by integrating and can contain extra solutions. We are looking
for solution without forward looking components, as suggested by initial formula (48).
Such a solution exists and can be written in the form of accelerationist Phillips curve:
πHkt = πHkt−1 +( 1− γ)δykt−1. (56)


















γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ)
(βπHkt+1 +
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)
γ
zkt).
where we need to substitute (55) with (56) before doing numerical simulations:
πHkt =
ω(1 + γβ)
γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ)
(πHkt−1 +( 1− γ)δykt−1) (58)
+
γ(1 − ω)
γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ)
(βπHkt+1 +
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)
γ
zkt).
Finally, (58) can be rewritten as




γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ)
,κ c =
(1 − ω)(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)ψ
(γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ))(ψ +  )σ
κy0 =
(1 − ω)(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)
(γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ))(ψ +  )
,κ y1 =
ω(1 + γβ)(1 − γ)
γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ)
δ
κs =
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)(1 − ω)ψ(1 − αd)
(γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ))(ψ +  )
A.3 Steady State
In symmetric steady state with zero inﬂation and prices normalised to one, the following
relationships should hold:
A =( 1 + i)(A +( 1− τ)Y − C) (59)
B =( 1 + i)(B + G − τY) (60)
ΦC = A + H (61)
H =
(1 − τ)(1 + i)(1 + p)
(1 + i)(1 + p) − 1
Y (62)
C = θY (63)
In order to obtain relationship (62) we compute steady state human capital as net
present value of steady state income, accounting for mortality rate. Equations (59) and
(60) are consistent with that Y = C + G. We assume that the steady state private
consumption constitute share θ of the steady state income, so the government consumption
is G =( 1− θ)Y.






(1 + p)(1 + i)
¶−1






(1 + p)(1 + i)
¶
(1 + i)(1 + p)(1 − τ)






(1 + p)(1 + i)
¶
A (64)
A = B = −
(1 + i
i
)(1 − τ − θ)Y (65)
Thus, in a steady state A = B, that can be found from equation (65), if we know θ
and τ.Alternatively, as the budget is not balanced in equilibrium, so there is some steady
state level of the government debt, B = A = BY, and equation (65) can be used to ﬁnd
the steady state level of tax rate, which ensures this steady state level of debt, given the
interest rate. Equation (64) is equation for i, the steady state level of interest rate; it has
a unique solution and in equilibrium 1+i>1/β.
30A.4 Aggregate Demand
Aggregation implies:
Yk = CHk + C
∗¯ k

























On the other hand,
Ck = CHk + CH¯ k (67)
and its linearisation yields:
















Now we substitute consumption into the aggregate demand and obtain:
















+ θαn( ˆ C
∗¯ k





Hk − ˆ C
2
H¯ k)















We linearise them and substitute in aggregate demand and assume symmetric countries.
We ﬁnally obtain the linear aggregate demand relationship:
ˆ Yk = θαd ˆ Ck + θαn ˆ C
∗
¯ k +( 1− θ) ˆ Gkt +2 θηαdαn ˆ Sk¯ k,
and its second-order version:



















(1 − θ) ˆ G
2
k + θαdαnηˆ S ˆ C
∗
¯ k + θαdαnηˆ Sk¯ k ˆ Ck
31A.5 Risk sharing condition
We derive it for the case of inﬁnitely-lived consumers only.







































= ϑt+m(Cjt+m,ξjt+m,Q t+m) (73)
where m is large.
We want formula (73) would be written in terms of term of trade, not the real exchaneg









Substitute linearised consumption and term of trade into (73) and get:
ˆ Ca = ˆ C
∗
















b − (αd − αn) ˆ Ca ˆ S − (αd − αn)gˆ ξa ˆ S
















b − ˆ Θt+m
Here ˆ Θt+m can be treated as shock, because by suﬃcient iterating forward, we make
Ckt+m Qt+m close to terminal conditions, which are explicitely deﬁned for jump variables
Ckt+m, and relative prices. We can make m as big as we want, and if we deal with small
shocks, then for large m all the terms are heavily discounted and their impact can be
made as small as required.
A.6 Useful relationsips
We can ﬁnd ˆ Sk¯ k from the risk sharing conditions and substitute it into aggregate demand:












ˆ C¯ k +( 1− θ) ˆ Gk
− θαdαnη(αd − αn) ˆ S
2
























ˆ Ckˆ ξk +
2θαdαnη(αd − αn)
σ(αd − αn)










































32We can take sum of them and obtain the following formula
³





























































ˆ Ca − ˆ Cb
´
ˆ Sab + tip
where tip are terms intependent of policy (including ˆ Θt+m). W eu s et h i sf o r m u l al a t e ri n
the text.
A.7 Government expenditures in ﬂexible price equilibrium
As aggregate demand relationships and risk sharing condition always hold, they are iden-
tities so we can diﬀerentiate them with respect to government expenditures, to obtain
relationships which will be valid along the solution to dynamic system.
Diﬀerentiate the aggregate demand relationships (with rspect to Ga, and the other
























































































































A labour market equilibrium condition () is also an identity along the dynamic path























































as functions of Ca,C b,S ab.
Additionally, a socially optimal ﬁscal policy should aim to maximise union-wide social
welfare, subject to static constraints (aggregate demand, risk sharing, labour market

























∂Ga. The resulting formula can be lin-
earised around steady state to yield:
gkξˆ ξk + g¯ kξˆ ξ¯ k = ˆ G
n
k + gksˆ S
n
k¯ k + gkc ˆ C
n
k + g¯ kc ˆ C
n
¯ k + gkyˆ Y
n
k + g¯ kyˆ Y
n
¯ k (82)
in the ﬂexible-price equilibrium, labelled with superscript n. In this formula
gkξ =1+
σ(ψ + θσ − θαn (ψ + θσ) − 2αnαdθ(σ − η)(1− θ))
(θσ + ψ)(−4αdθ(σ − η)(1− αd)+ψ + θσ)
g¯ kξ = −
2θσαnαd (σ − η)(1− θ)+θαd (ψ + θσ)
(θσ + ψ)(−4αdθ(σ − η)αn + ψ + θσ)
gks = −
2σαdαnθη
(−4θαdαn (σ − η)+ψ + θσ)
gkc =
θσαn(2θ(σ − η)αd − (ψ + θσ))
(θσ + ψ)(−4θαdαn (σ − η)+ψ + θσ)
g¯ kc =
θσαd(2θ(σ − η)αn − (ψ + θσ))
(θσ + ψ)(−4θαdαn (σ − η)+ψ + θσ)
gky =
σ(ψ + θσ − 2θ(σ − η)αdαn)
(θσ + ψ)(−4αdαnθ(σ − η)+ψ + θσ)
g¯ ky = −
2θσαnαd(σ − η)
(θσ + ψ)(−4αdαnθ(σ − η)+ψ + θσ)
34B Social loss function
The one-period utility function can be obtained by linearisation of one-period utility
function in (1) up to the second-order terms (we assume symmetry):




























































































uC(C,1)C. The ﬁrst condition follows







and in order to derive the second expression we closely follow Beetsma and Jensen (2003).










and it is derived in Additional Appendix from optimality condition for the ﬁscal author-
ities.
We now need to derive a formula for varzˆ y(z), along the lines in Rotemberg and


























We now substitite consumption from formula (75) into (83) and, using (84) and (85),
35obtain:






































































































ˆ Caˆ ξa −
g
σ





























































It is clear that the same subsidy 1−τ
µ =1that eliminates linear term in output also
eliminates linear term in government expenditures, so welfare can be simpliﬁed to:










































− 2αnηαd (αd − αn)
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a − σ ˆ C
n











b − σ ˆ C
n











a − ˆ C
n











b − ˆ C
n








































































36where we substituted natural rates for taste/technology shocks, using formula (22). This
is formula (36) in the main text.
C Compensating Consumption
Having computed the social loss in stochastic equilibrium for an optimal policy, we can give
an interpretation of losses in terms of ‘real world’ variables. This optimal policy results
in stochastic volatility W of the key variables and steady state level of consumption C .
We now ﬁnd percent reduction in steady-state consumption under the benchmark policy
that makes household as well oﬀ as under our optimal policy. This benchmark policy
is with no stochastic volatility, but results in a new steady state level of consumption
of C + ΩC. We determine the percentage change in consumption Ω such that we have
the same level of welfare under both policies. A form of utility function is not assumed
known, but uC(C,1)/uCC(C,1)C = −σ in the steady state.
Formula (??) shows that the level of the welfare (to a second order approximation) of














where U is intra-period value of the social welfare function and C, G and Y refer to steady
state levels of consumption, government spending and output. Under the benchmark



















































s−tUs using the procedure outlined in Currie and Levine (1993), see
the working paper version of this paper for details (?).
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